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The Role of the American Bar Association in the
Selection of Federal Judges: Episodic
Involvement to Institutionalized Power
Joel B. Grossman*
The American Bar Association now has a strong voice in the selection
of federal judges. It has attained this influence through many years of
efforts to have recognized the wisdom of allowing members of the
profession to pass on the qualifications of those who will judge their
cases. Mr. Grossman traces the development of the ABA's influence in
this area and concludes that its success has been in large part a product
of the development of the ABA itself into a representative body of
the American legal profession.

One phenomenon of recent domestic politics has been the resurgence of the American Bar Association as a vital, and often
influential, group in the political process as well as in the legal
profession. There is no better characterization of this than the ABA's
assumption of a lead position in a profession-wide campaign to
improve the quality of judges selected for the several court systems
in the United States. In a relatively short span of time, the ABA has
grown from a group with a minimum of influence to one with a
quasi-formal role in the federal selection process. Its success has
meant, among other things, that the role of the organized bar in
judicial selection has acquired a measure of legitimacy never before
attained. To be sure, the federal selection process is not yet completely "bar centered." But the impact of the ABA's influence on the
process is clear and unmistakable. Tracing the growth of the ABA's
influence and prerogatives in the selection of federal judges, and
suggesting some factors contributing to this development, will be
the major purpose of this article.
I. THE ABA's TRADrmONAL INTEREST IN JUDIcIAL SELEC-TON

Through its activities and major policy pronouncements, the
American Bar Association has always demonstrated a continuing
interest in the selection of judges. Although the selection of "good"
judges was not specifically enumerated as an object of the newly
formed Association in 1878, it is fair, in the light of the early activities
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin.
This paper is drawn from a larger study by the author, GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AM
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of the ABA, to consider it as immanent in the "promotion of the

administration of justice"-always a major articulated goal of the
Association. The first official statement of the ABA's interest in
judicial selection apparently came in 1908, when the Committee on
Professional Ethics listed "The Selection of Judges" as the second
Canon of Professional Ethics:
It is the duty of the Bar to endeavor to prevent political considerations
from outweighing judicial fitness in the selection of Judges. It should protest
earnestly and actively against the appointment or election of those who are
unsuitable for the Bench; and it should strive to have elevated thereto only
those willing to forego other employments, whether of a business, political,
or other character, which may embarass their free and fair consideration of
questions before them for decision. The aspiration of lawyers for judicial
position should be governed by an impartial estimate of their ability to
add honor to the office and not by a desire for the distinction the position
may bring to themselves. 1

With the addition only of two clarifying "opinions," this statement of
the lawyer's
position vis-a-vis the selection process has remained
2

unchanged.

But, neither this nor any other canon of the Association provides
guidance as to the specific goals to be achieved, the standards of

qualification for "good judges," or the expected or desired role which
the ABA was to play in securing such judges. How were these goals
to be achieved?
The working policy goals of the Association were left to be determined by the contemporary leadership. Typical of the frequently
enunciated policy statements was the following Report of the 1924
Committee on Judicial Selection:
Certain postulates we accept as basic. It is both the right and the duty of
the Bar to act in this selection process. The right springs from that
inherent privilege which entitles one to demand that he who is chosen
from his fellows to sit in judgment of the cause must needs bear worthily
that distinction and meet four square the traditional tests of an exalted
professional attainment. Born of this, society in turn, has rightfully to require
a recognition and performance of the correlative obligation. That duty is
fulfilled only when the Bar, offering for its aid and counsel, has registered
in full measure its conception of judicial fitness, founded, as it must be,
upon a discernment of those qualities of mind and heart, those traits of
poise and patience that mark in man the true judicial temperament. To the
extent that society accords recognition of this right and that the Bar
exerts its duty will results be achieved. 3
1. CoM3ir

ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

567, 576 (1908).
2. Opinions 189, 226,

ETmcs,

FiAL REPoRT, 33

A.B.A.

REP.

OPINIONS OF THE CoM'.TIrrEiE ON PnOF-siONAL ETiucs AND
Gnnv,.css, AmEtIcAN BAR AssocmAnoN, 373, 451 (1957).
3. Coinrrl
r
ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, REPORT, 10 A.B.AJ. 820 (1924).
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Beneath the flowery rhetoric the point was abundantly clear. The Bar,
as the representative of the legal profession, had not only the right
but the duty to actively offer its services in the judicial selection
process. Furthermore, the implication is clear that the choice of
judges by a process which excludes the voice-or voices-of the
organized Bar is to be condemned.
Missing from this statement, however, was any indication of what
precise standards of qualification were to be sought. What was it
about prospective judges that other lawyers were especially adept
at perceiving and evaluating? Was it legal scholarship, courtroom
ability, capacity for philosophical thought? "No," said the American
Bar Association that same year. "It would, of course, be ideal if every
judge were a profound jurist and yet it is probably better that he
should have a listening ear than that he be too sure of the correctness
of his own conclusions."
The prime requisites of a judge are . . .integrity and a keen sense of
justice. With these qualities and a willingness to hear all that is to be said
on both sides of a debatable proposition, little more is required than the
faculty of perception, and that type of intellectual serenity which for want
of a better name we call the 'judicial temperament.' 4

These broadly stated goals of the ABA regarding the selection of
judges have not materially changed in the intervening years. The
claim is still made that "because lawyers are the only group of
citizens that are in daily contact with the courts, they are the only
group that are really able to judge the qualifications necessary for
good judicial material."5
The American Bar Association's continuing interest in judicial selection was in keeping with the Bar's venerable tradition of political
leadership and public service. But as many friendly critics perceived,
this continuity of formal objectives was a facade which concealed the
changing nature of the Bar's concept of public service. Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone, writing in 1934, declared that "candor would compel
even those of us who have the most abiding faith in our profession,
and the finest belief in its capacity for future usefulness, to admit that
in our own time the Bar has not maintained its traditional position
of public influence and leadership."6
Nowhere was this change better seen than in the efforts of the
ABA to influence the process of judicial selection and in its obvious
motives in so doing. One of the underlying reasons for the formation
4. The Improvement of the JudicialMachine, 10 A.B.A.J. 176-77 (1924).
5. Editorial Comment on Fox, The Selection of Federal Judges: The Work of the
Federal Judician Committee, 43 A.B.A.J. 685 (1957).
6. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HAsv. L. REv. 1 (1934).
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of the American Bar Association in 1878 was the felt need to "do
something" about a trend of judicial decisions illustrated by Munn v.
Illinois.7 Committed as they were to the growing industrial empire,
the Bar leaders saw the judiciary as the last bastion of defense against
encroachments upon the entreprenurial prerogative, and intensified
their efforts to assure the recruitment of judges who shared their own
views of society. These efforts strengthened the public leadership
consciousness of the Bar; but the forms of such leadership rested
upon values and assumptions which were at considerable variance
with the new progressivism of the twentieth century. An inevitable
"confusion" between professional qualifications and ideological soundness marked the judicial selection efforts of the American Bar Association through the New Deal period." These efforts, ostensibly
aimed toward insuring the professional quality of judges, were clear
and frank attempts to gain a measure of control over the
judicial decision-making process. But while these efforts may have
been at variance with the traditional "public service" concept, they
underscored some of the basic and continuing motivations for lawyers'
interest in controlling judicial personnel. Far from being the sole
output of a tradition of public service, the Bar's efforts reflected the
need and desire of lawyers to exercise an effective control over the
policies and practices of the judicial process. It was as much selfinterest as public interest which provided the occasion and the
impetus for the ABA's judicial selection efforts.

II.

EmARY INvOLvEMENTs IN JuJDICIL SELECTION

As opposed to its continuing interest, the activities of the American
Bar Association in the area of judicial selection prior to 1946
fluctuated from intense effort and participation to passive comment.
Its initial efforts consisted mainly of exhorting state and local bar
groups to take a more active part in the selection process at their
own levels.9 The ABA was never without at least one committee
concerned with general questions of judicial qualification and tenure,
but these committees operated largely through the local bar groups.
Its occasional intense participation was motivated more often than not
by concern for the continued functioning of the judiciary in the
manner and on the terms which the ABA believed consonant with
7. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
8. Twiss, LAwYERs AND TnE CoNsTrrtruoN (1942).

In addition to Twiss, who was

basically a critic of the ABA, the conservative domination of the Bar's activities has
been
TION
THE
9.

acknowledged by RurrEnFoD, THE INFLuENCE OF THE A mRcAN BAn AssOcIAON PUBLIC OpiNiON AND LECISLA-ION 115-30 (1937). See also SclamHAusm,
SuPRmEnl
CounT: ITs PoLrITcs, PEnSoNALrnFs, AND PROCEDURMES (1960).
ON JUDICIAL SELECTON, 14 A.B.A.J. 617 (1928).
Cf. REPORT OF Tmx CoMM71rMi
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historical American values.
As illustrations of this episodic participation, and the reasons for
it, we will briefly examine three cases. Each details the ABA's response to what it called the "socialist menace," the "threatened subversion of the judiciary," or the "down-grading of property rights."
(1) The response of the American Bar Association to the campaign
for recall of judges (1910-1920) was an intense, vituperative, almost
hysterical propaganda offensive designed to alert the public to the
alleged evils of such reform. Beginning with the appointment of a
large "Committee to Oppose Judicial Recall," the ABA sought to
enlist the aid of all local bar groups in the fight.10 In its first year,
that Committee worked hard to stimulate interest and action on the
part of the state and local bar associations." Three years later, it
decided to broaden its forum from the Bar to the lay public. "Judicial
Recall" was made the subject of high school and college debates and
lectures. Essay contests were sponsored, with the winning paper
receiving wide publicity and publication. 2
As the impetus of the judicial recall movement slackened, the
Committee claimed a large share of the credit, but warned that the
"'menace of the judicial-recall fallacy . . . still persists; and your
committee has directed its activities during the past year to combating certain theories and measures which have for their object
either direct or indirect judicial recall, as a means . . . to weaken or
destroy constitutional safeguards." 3 Probably the most effective
propaganda technique the Committee had at its disposal was the
"socialist smear." By the simple device of labelling judicial recall
as
a socialist vice, the Committee was able to infect all those who supported the movement without their professing adherence to socialist
principles:
The propaganda of Socialism, which is now so wide spread .

.

. is, from

its political viewpoint, one of attack upon constitutional government ....
It is promoted, not alone by the avowed socialist, but by numerous allies,

comprising many who would disavow the name of "Socialist' . . . . The
socialist political platforms continuously advocate as the first necessary

means of establishing socialism, the adoption of judicial recall. The ultimate
object of the socialists is the confiscation of property and property rights
and the turning over of all property to common ownership in the name of

the state. They must first, then, eliminate that judicial function which was
established in this country to safeguard the life, liberty and property of
10. REPORT OF THE CominTEE TO OPPOSE JuDIcAL RECALL,

36 A.B.A. REP. 51

(1911).

11. REPORT

OF THE ComArrTEE TO OPPOSE JuICIAL RECALL,

(1912).
12. REPORT OF TH

ComimrrTEE TO OPPOSE JUDICIAL RECALL,

39 A.B.A. REP. 607-08

CommrrTEE TO OPPOSE JUDIcIuL RECALL,

3 A.B.A.J. 454 (1917).

(1914).
13. REPORT OF

THE

37 A.B.A. REP. 574-75
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the individual. They would abolish the United States Senate and all courts
...and they urge the abolition of the power "usurped"... by the Supreme

Court of the United States to pass upon the constitutionality of legislative

acts, and the revision (presumably on a socialist basis) of the Constitution
of the United States. . . .The judicial function of declaring invalid any
statute which contravenes constitutional safeguards to individual rights of
property and liberty is, so long as it continues, a barrier to the establish-

ment of a government of Socialism. 14

By 1918, there appeared to be little vitality left in the recall movement, but the Committee was continued as a safeguard. 15
(2) The response of the American Bar Association to the 1916
nomination of Louis D. Brandeis as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court was also a defense of the dominant ideological values held by
leaders of the American Bar Association. Since, at that time, the
ABA did not have any formal mechanism designed to evaluate specific
candidates for the federal bench, its opposition to Brandeis was in
the form of a signed statement by ex-President Taft and six other
former Presidents of the Association submitted to the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Although the statement emphasized that Brandeis' "reputation, character, and professional career" made him "not a fit person
to be a member of the Supreme Court,"'16 it was clear that it was in
fact his political and social views which the ABA leaders opposed.
In light of his considerable success as a lawyer fighting in opposition to
some of the most cherished and widely held values of the Association,
Brandeis' legal ability could not be seriously questioned. In the
words of Roscoe Pound, who was testifying at the hearings, "Mr.
Brandeis is in truth a very great lawyer. . . . So far as sheer
legal ability is concerned, he will rank with the best who have sat
upon the bench of the Supreme Court."17 It was, of course, Brandeis'
tenacious advocacy of minority causes which brought upon his head
the wrath of the ABA leadership.
The Brandeis case has been extensively treated elsewhere, and the
facts are too well known to require further documentation here. What
interests us, however, is the type and adequacy of the response of
the American Bar Association. That the opposition of the ABA to
Brandeis did not come through "channels," but was articulated as
the personal views of seven former presidents, should not be interpreted as something less than the accurate views of the then small
membership of the ABA. At that stage in its development it was still
14. Id. at 456-57.
15. REPORT OF THE

(1918).

COMM=rTEE TO OPPOSE JUDICIAL RECALL,

43 A.B.A.

REP.

85-87

16. MASON, BRANDEIs: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 489 (1946).
17. Hearings Before The Committee on the Judiciary on Nomination of Louis 1.
Brandeis, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 251 (1916).
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primarily a closely knit group of successful lawyers whose views
probably coincided with those expressed by the seven presidents.
Yet the near success which the campaign against Brandeis had could
be attributed in part to the personal prestige of the seven presidents,
and their ability to mobilize other forces in support of their case.
The American Bar Association had not, as yet, developed any formal
mechanism for the scrutiny of the federal judicial selection process.
(3) Prior to 1932, the only formal concern of the American Bar
Association, with the selection of judges, with minor exceptions, was
with the state systems. It paid little attention to the particular persons
chosen as judges in the states, and no attention at all to the federal
judicial selection process. Its concern with particular Supreme Court
appointments was haphazard. One reason for this attitude may have
been that in the period from 1878-1937, the federal courts, and
especially the United States Supreme Court, were generally considered able defenders of and protagonists for the economic and social
values espoused by the ABA, whereas in the same period the state
courts-many with elected judges-were considered centers of radical
thought. The ABA's severe condemnation of the Roosevelt Plan to
increase the membership of the Supreme Court in 1937, when compared to its ambivalence toward "anti-court" measures in 1958 when
the Supreme Court no longer represented conservative views, would
support the hypothesis that it was not the Supreme Court, per se,
that was being defended in 1937, but rather its making of "good"
policy.' The ABA's disenchantment with the Supreme Court after
1937 was accompanied by a developing support of the state courts,
which in the same period appeared to embrace many of the classical
liberal values now rejected by the federal courts.
Among the most significant of the ABA's responses to these changes
in the political position of the federal courts vis-a-vis selected conservative values was a variety of attempts to exert greater systematic
influence in the selection of federal judges. As early as 1924, the
Committee on Judicial Selection of the Conference of Bar Association
Delegates suggested that
If the principle of bar selection is right within the State, it is right within
the nation-the more so, indeed, if made to serve a more exalted purpose.

It is not to be countenanced, to be sure, that there be the least obtrusion

upon this presidential power and prerogative, but it must be true that there

lie here the possibilities for helpful suggestion which unquestionably would
serve well when occasion should demand. 19

18. Cf. Westin, When the Public Judges the Court, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1959, §
6 (Magazine), pp. 16, 41.
19. REPORT or m CONnMrL-EE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, 10 A.B.A.J. 820, 824

(1924).
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No action was taken on this suggestion. The possibility of participation by the organized Bar in the federal selection process was, however, suggested by Attorney-General William D. Mitchell in 1931.
Although he distrusted the results of "bar primaries," Mitchell felt
that "an overwhelming sentiment by the Bar for or against a particular
man makes a deep impression upon the public mind, upon the senators
especially interested, and on the appointing power. This is founded
on the realization that a lawyer's qualities are most clearly discerned
by the members of his own profession."20 Mitchell indicated that the
Hoover Administration made it a practice to consult with the bar of
the country on federal judgeships:
In the Department, we often make up a list of lawyers of professional
standing and public spirit, in the community where the appointment is to

be made, and send them personal letters asking for confidential information,
and in such cases, with rare exceptions, we get a frank, sincere, illuminating

picture of the men under consideration. 21

Encouraged by this receptive attitude on the part of the Administration, and disturbed by the Senate's rejection of Judge John Parker's
nomination to the Supreme Court in 1930, the American Bar Association made its first formal attempt to gain access to the federal
selection process at the confirmation stage. It established, in 1932, a
Special Committee of 52 lawyers to advise the Senate Judiciary
Committee on all judicial nominations. As is usually the case, the
formation of a new special committee indicated the recognition of a
new, important problem area:
The Special Committee on Federal Appointments .

.

. will deal with a new

aspect of the old problem of judicial selection. Heretofore, discussion of
the problem has been generally confined to the mode of selection of the state
judges-whether by appointment or by election-and where the latter method

prevails, to the ways in which the bar can best make its superior information
as to the fitness of judicial candidates available to and influential with
the electorate. Genuine progress has been made in that direction.
But now the matter of confirmation, an essential part of the process of
judicial selection in some states and in the Federal judicial system in
particular, is seen to be of no less importance. It does not concern the
machinery, but the manner in which machinery for naming a Federal Judge

is operated.m

With specific reference to the Parker case, the ABA expressed its
concern whether "the grounds urged for or against confirmation are
such as may properly be considered in the choice of a judge?"23 It
20. Appointment of Federal Judges, Id. at 569, 572.

21. Ibid.
22. Concerning Federal Judicial Appointments, 59 A.B.A. REP. 610 (1934).
23. Ibid.
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stated its objection to the practice of disapproving nominees solely
because of disagreement with decisions they had made as judges of
other courts, "which decisions have been rendered in accordance
with precedent and in the performance of that high duty which
calls for fearless and impartial determination of all issues under the
established principles of law . . ."24 The Resolution setting up the
Committee called upon the Senate to refuse to consider such allegations as valid evidence.
The Committee was set up primarily to advise the Senate Judiciary
Committee. But some attempt was also made to extend its operations
to the nomination stage although the ABA did not appear to be
dissatisfied with the nominations of the Hoover Administration. Due
undoubtedly to the change in Administrations shortly after the formation of the Committee in 1932, its services were never once requested
by either the new Attorney-General or Senate Judiciary Committee,
and at its own request, the Committee was discontinued in 1934.2
Reviewing the activities of the American Bar Association in the
area of federal judicial selection from 1878 to 1945, it is abundantly
clear that they were primarily responses to the shifts in political
orientation and position which began to characterize not only the
federal courts, but the appointing agents as well. By the time the
ABA developed a concern over the decision trends in the federal
courts, however, and sought to assert its influence in the federal selection process, it had come upon a period of reduced prestige. In its
attempts to preserve a political philosophy on the wane, the ABA lost
much of the comforts and strengths normally accruing to a nonpartisan, learned profession-strengths which even had they been
preserved would probably have fared poorly in the wake of the liberal
revival of the New Deal. Deprived by its own actions of its credentials
as a wholly "professional" group, still representing but a fraction of
the legal profession, and trying to operate in a very unfavorable
political climate, the American Bar Association could only wait for
the day when its own resources and a favorable political situation
would make its attempts to influence the selection of federal judges
more rewarding. That day was not long in coming.

III. Tim

FORMAmTION OF T=E COMMrrTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY

Responding perhaps to a more propitious climate, and also to a series
of events which had cast shadows upon the reputation of the United
States Supreme Court, the American Bar Association again sought, in
1946, to create the mechanism and the mood which would enable
24. ibid.
25. REPORT OF THE SPECLAL COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS, 59 A.B.A. REP.

610 (1934).
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it to "resume" its campaign for "maintaining high standards of
qualification and conduct on the part of judges of the courts of the
United States."2
The three events which could be designated as primary stimuli of
the ABA's action were (1) the erupted feud between Supreme Court
Justices Black and Jackson; (2) the decision of that court in the
Southeastern Underwriters case; 27 and (3) the absence from the
Supreme Court of Justice Jackson while he was serving as Chief Allied
Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Trials. Thus, a case of deviant
judicial behavior, an "upsetting" decision with serious consequences
for the continuation of an historic legal doctrine, and a case of alleged
judicial maladministration triggered the ABA's action.
The Black-Jackson feud, which began quietly over Black's failure
to disqualify himself from a case argued by his former law partner, 2
erupted when Jackson, in a wire from Nuremberg, accused Black
of feeding anti-Jackson stories to the press and revealing the confidential proceedings of the Court in an effort to discredit Jackson's
candidacy for the Chief Justiceship.2 The nationwide reaction to
this feud was bitter. Some newspapers sought to justify the actions
of one or the other of the Justices. Many suggested that both
"quietly and decently . . . step down from the bench they have
disgraced." 30 The New York Times declared editorially that "Justice
Jackson has committed an error in taste and . . . Justice Black has
committed the worse offense of lowering judicial standards." 31 A
nationwide poll published two weeks later indicated a substantial
portion of the population was disturbed by the bickering among the
Justices and critical of the caliber of some of the recent appointments
to the high bench. 32 There was a brief cry in Congress for impeachment of justice Black and/or investigation of the incident, but the idea
33
was smothered by the Democratic leadership.
Regardless of the merits of the dispute, there was considerable
adverse reaction to the Court, and it was a perfect opportunity for
a group, such as the ABA, to begin a campaign to improve the quality
of judges. This incident served to compound the smouldering dis26. PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTIONS

330 (1946).

71 A.B.A.

REP.

307,

27. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

28. The case was Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897
(1945). Good descriptions of the feud can be found in GERHmDT, AMEnRICA'S ADVOcATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 235-77 (1958); MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF
T=m LAw 642-47 (1956).
29. New York Times, June 11, 1946, p. 1, col. 8.
30. GERmArDT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 263.
31. New York Times, June 12, 1946, p. 26, col. 3.
32. GER1ARDT, op. cit. supra note 28, at 263.
33. Ibid.
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satisfaction with the Supreme Court which had already existed for
several years. This initial dissatisfaction resulted from the 1944
decision in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Association.
Here, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, had in effect overruled an 1869 decision by holding that insurance businesses regulated
by individual states were interstate commerce and thus not subject
to discriminatory state taxation.m Congress responded to this decision by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which authorized state
regulation and taxation of the insurance business free of the limitations
of federal regulation. 35 Nevertheless, the Southeastern decision had
had, for the brief time it was in effect, an upsetting influence on
the laws of insurance. More important, it came to be regarded by
some lawyers as symptomatic of the disregard which the Supreme
Court was showing for traditional values and legal precedents.
Dissatisfaction with the Court had also resulted from the absence
of Justice Jackson, who was appointed by President Truman to serve
at Nuremberg over the protests of Chief Justice Stone. Very irritating
to litigants and lawyers alike was the fact that Jackson's absence had
caused a number of 4-4 decisions to be withheld pending his return.
The work of the Court was obviously suffering with one less hand to
share the burdens of opinion writing.
Meeting in July 1946 the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association engaged in a heated debate with the above incidents
the chief topics. Former ABA President William L. Ransom of
New York sought to channel these expressed emotions toward more
"constructive" ends:
Respect for all our courts is the cornerstone of the American federal

system. Disrespect for the courts in a republic endangers the foundations of
its free institutions. Criticism of the courts is a right and function of the

Bar . . . . [But] mere criticism and the expression of disrespect fall short of
what is expected of us.... This House ought to do something constructive
and remedial .... The profession and the public look to us for action now.n

Rather than adopt resolutions concerning specific situations, Ransom
urged the delegates to "take such present action as will enable prompt
action in behalf of the Association when needed, and assure also the
remedial study of such criticisms and suggestions as have been made
here this week." He successfully argued that the best course to follow
would be the establishment of a Committee "charged with the duty
of considering and initiating action by the Association as to such
34. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958). The Supreme Court accepted this Congressional
"reversal" in Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
36. PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEcATES, 32 A.B.A.J. 401, 421 (1946).
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situations as have developed as to some members of the federal
judiciary. .... 37
Pursuant to a motion by Ransom, the House constituted a Special
Committee on the Judiciary of eleven members, one from each
judicial circuit and the District of Columbia. The Committee was
charged to report back to the House of Delegates its recommendations
regarding the proper action to take "to promote the appointment and
confirmation of competent and qualified candidates and to oppose the
nomination or confirmation of unfit candidates." Furthermore, it was
to recommend courses of action to be followed "whenever any judge of
any federal court has.., become disqualified or unfit to continue on
the bench, or has been guilty of acts or conducts amounting to less
than 'good behavior' within the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States." The Committee was also directed to consider the
merits of two resolutions designed to alter the existing methods of
choosing Supreme Court Justices, and to prevent sitting Justices from
accepting off-court assignments. 8
Thus, after a twelve year interval, the American Bar Association
was to make a concerted effort to "reestablish the prerogatives" of the
organized Bar in the selection of federal judges. To the editors of
the American Bar Association Journal,
There were many indications that the profession and the public looked
to the Association for leadership and action. It is no longer sufficient to talk
about the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and its aloofness

from controversies extraneous to submitted cases. Those who believe in
those standards for the judiciary will have to go to work to insist that they

be maintained.
The resolutions... entrust to the new Committee a duty and responsibility
which the Association has not hitherto undertaken. 39

The Committee on Federal Judiciary (as it was later named) has
become the major instrument in the post-war campaign of the

American Bar Association to exert a direct influence on the selection
of specific persons as federal judges. From the formation of this
committee in 1946 until the present, the American Bar Association
has sought (and to a large degree achieved) public and official
approval for the right and the duty of the organized Bar to be
consulted in the actual selection of judges. Its successful campaign
to achieve this goal marks the first time in American history that the
legal profession has been accorded that privilege at the federal level.
37. Ibid.
38. PROCEEDMNCS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 71 A.B.A. REP. 307, 328-31 (1946).

39. Editorial,32 A.B.A.J. 478 (1946).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICiARY

The long-range goals of the Committee on Federal Judiciary were
decided after considerable debate at the 1946 Annual Meeting and
1947 Winter Meeting of the American Bar Association. The first
report of the Special Committee formed in 1946 recommended that,
in addition to having the power to oppose or recommend nominations
already made by the President and considering questions about the
behavior of sitting judges, it should also be permitted to "promote"
the nomination of qualified persons. The Committee felt that "the
only effective method of opposing a proposed nominee not qualified
for judicial office is by supporting a qualified nominee."40 Pursuing
this argument on the floor of the House of Delegates, Chairman John
Buchanan of Pittsburgh argued that:
You cannot oppose very successfully a man with powerful political
backing, who has an unimpeachable family and church record, and

a modest practice in which he has been guilty of no misconduct, unless you
can support, in his stead, the appointment of a real lawyer. And the
Committee believes that real lawyers will be willing to signify their willing-

ness to accept appointments to the federal bench if they can be assured of
the backing of the Organized Bar....

Without that support, real lawyers will stand little chance against the
men who have supported a party ticket through thick and through thin;

not without reward in appointment to minor offices, but who think that
they have reached the place in political service which entitles them to
recognition as judges of the federal courts.41

Opposition to the granting of this not inconsiderable power was
strong, however, and the question was tabled by a resolution to
continue the Committee "in its present form."4
The question of revising the Committee's charter was then submitted to the Board of Governors for consideration. At the 1947
winter meeting, the Board came out in opposition to the proposed
grant. Instead, it suggested that the Association should urge Congress
to establish, by law, qualifications of eligibility for appointment to
the federal bench, including minimum requirements of legal practice
and judicial experience. 43 The President of the ABA, Carl Rix, dissented from the Governors' position and urged the House of Delegates
to grant the Committee the power to promote nominations. If the
Committee were granted this power, it would serve to aid the state
and local bar associations in influencing the nomination of judges in
40. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMrrTEE ON JUDICIARY, 71 A.B.A. REP. 234, 236
(1946).
41. PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 33 A.B.A.J. 191 (1947).
42. Id. at 192.
43. Id. at 396.
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their own locales; otherwise, they would be forced to continue to
"deal with an appointing power which, without our help, is beyond
their reach."" By a vote of 79-52, the House overruled the recommendation of the Board of Governors. It empowered the Committee,
on behalf of the Association, to promote the nomination and confirmation
of competent persons for appointment as judges of courts of the United
States and to oppose the nomination and confirmation of persons deemed

by it to be not sufficiently qualified. It shall have power also to report to
the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors on any questions rematters relating to
lating to the behavior of judges of such courts and any
judiciary. 45

the sufficiency of the members of the federal

Pending the achievement of some results by which to evaluate the
Committee's operations, it was continued as a Special Committee.
Its general goals and prerogatives settled early in its existence, the
Committee was relatively free to create and develop its functions
in accord with the objectives of the Association and the realities of the
judicial selection process. Since the eighteen year history of the
Committee is essentially one of increased prestige and prerogative,
it is useful to analyze its growth in sections corresponding to three
different time periods, which may be characterized as (1) 1946-1952,
a period of development and indifferent success; (2) 1952-1958, a
period of increased public acceptance as part of the selection process;
and (3) 1958-1964, a period of maximum influence within the
presently constituted selection system.
(1) The most noteworthy achievement of the Committee during
the 1946-1952 period was its establishment of a working relationship
with the Senate Judiciary Committee. Almost immediately upon its
formation, the Committee was invited by the Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee to either testify or file a recommendation
on each nomination given a hearing. Thus, the collective views of the
Committee would become a regular factor in the confirmation process.
The formation of the ABA Committee coincided with the election
of the 80th Congress, the first since 1930 in which the Republican
Party controlled both Houses. Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin,
slated to assume the Chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee,
announced that his Committee would try to stem the tide of "leftist"
judges periodically appointed during Democratic Administrations,
and that at least some non-Democratic judges would have to be
appointed.46 Perhaps to emphasize his new order, Wiley announced
44. Ibid.

§ 7(k) (2).
See also Judges of Federal Courts: Association Will Promote Qualified Nominations,
33 A.B.A.J. 305-06 (1947).
46. New York Times, December 2, 1946, p. 26, col. 3.
45. CONST. AND By-LAws OF THE AmmEucAN BAn AssoCIATION art. X,

1964]

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION

that so long as he was Chairman, "full weight will be given to the
recommendation of recognized and respected legal groups in contrast
to those of political officials." And, he added, "the opinions of the
American Bar Association and other recognized legal groups have not
47
been accorded the weight and respect which are their just due."
Wiley requested all State Bar Associations to assume the responsibility
of giving him information on the "character, legal ability, temperament, and the political philosophy" of all nominees.4 8
Although there is no precise evidence (nor could there be), it is
not unreasonable to assume that this privilege accorded the ABA and
other bar groups was symbolic of the reaction to a long period of
Democratic control. Would the ABA have been issued the same
"invitation" if the 80th Congress had remained in Democratic hands?
As a constant critic of the actions and decisions of the post-1937
Supreme Court Justices, the ABA was the perfect instrument through
which Senate Republicans could attempt inroads on the nominations
of a Democratic President. Since they would not normally be consulted in advance of nominations by a President of the opposite party
anyway, and since by the rules (informal) of the Senate, they could
not claim personal privilege to block nominations in their own state,
Senate Republicians could use the adverse recommendations of the
ABA and local bar groups to either justify occasional rejections of
confirmation or to persuade the President to nominate "more acceptable" persons.
Consultation, however, is not the same as influence, and members
of the ABA Committee who testified before the Judiciary Committee
in this period found that the mere fact that they opposed a particular
nominee carried little or no weight with the senators unless specific
evidence of disqualification was presented. Then, as now, the senators on the Committee-all lawyers themselves-refused to accept as
valid objections to a nomination the opinions of a few bar leaders.
The mere assertion that "there were other better qualified men
available" had little or no effect on the senators. Regardless of party
affiliation, they had a stake in perpetuating the system which accorded
the privilege of "selection" to senators of the President's party, and
therefore relegated the task of the judiciary Committee to sifting
evidence of disqualification only.
A good illustration of the type of situation in which the ABA Committee could function most effectively was the Frieda Hennock case.
In 1951, President Truman nominated Miss Hennock, a member of the
Federal Communications Commission, to the Federal District Court
47. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ComnrrrE ON JUDIclARY,

(1947).
48. New York Times, February 3, 1947, p. 14, col. 3.

72 A.B.A. REP. 411, 412
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for the Southern District of New York. In 1949, Miss Hennock's
name had been submitted to the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York for evaluation, and that group had reported her "not
qualified." When she did receive the nomination in 1951, they again
opposed her, and were now supported by the ABA Committee on
Federal Judiciary. 49 She was supported by various women's bar
groups and the Federal Bar Association for the Second Circuit. In
this case the ABA was able to present, in secret hearings, a substantial
amount of derogatory information concerning the ethics of an agreement she had entered into in 1934. The evidence was described as
"so adverse" that it could not be seen how further testimony would
change the picture. 50 The Senate Committee then pigeon-holed the
nomination and it died there with the end of the session. President
Truman then offered Miss Hennock a recess appointment-as he had
frequently done with other nominations opposed in the Senate-but
she declined. To accept the recess appointment would have meant
giving up the security of her FCC position with little assurance that
she would be confirmed by the Senate. President Truman then
appointed David Edelstein, an Assistant Attorney-General. Edelstein
was also opposed by the5 ABA Committee, but his nomination was
confirmed with dispatch. 1
The hiatus of Republican control of the Senate lasted but two
years, and the Democratic Committee Chairman from 1949-1953 did
not hold the ABA in the same affection as had Senator Wiley. Although Senator Pat McCarran continued the practice of formally
requesting an ABA opinion on each nominee, he declared that he was
"firmly resolved that the bar associations shall not choose the judiciary
of the country." 52
Thus, although it did contribute to the rejection of four judgeship nominations during this period, the ABA Committee was unable
to do much to promote the nomination of high quality judges. It was
not accorded the privilege of "re-evaluating" the abilities of the
prospective nominee. Its only chance of successfully blocking a nomination lay in showing that the nominee had been guilty of deviant
behavior. The Committee's relationship with the Senate Judiciary
Committee was not, however, without its benefits to the ABA. It
publicized the Association's activities, and acknowledged its role in
the selection process, providing a coating of legitimacy to the Com49. New York Times, June 13, 1951, p. 17, col. 1, and June 28, 1951, p. 16, col. 4.
50. New York Times, September 28, 1951, p. 24, col. 2.
51. New York Times, November 2, 1951, p. 1, col. 7.
52. New York Times, August 5, 1951, p. 26, col. 3.
53. From 1947 through 1952, the ABA Committee actively opposed ten nominations
to the federal courts, four of which were subsequently rejected by the Senate.
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mittee's efforts. It gave the Committee a public forum from which
it could announce its standards and solicit support.
It was immediately clear, however, that the main thrust of the
Committee's influence would have to come at the nomination stage
of the selection process. This was immediately recognized by the
first members of the Special Committee, and a delegation was sent
to confer with Assistant Attorney-General Douglas McGregor. They
informed McGregor of the powers of the Committee and asked that
it be consulted regarding any persons being considered for nomination to the federal bench. As reported by the delegation, "McGregor
stated that the request was a novel one, which the Chairman . . .
readily admitted."M McGregor promised to submit the request to
the Attorney-General, but even with a second plea, the Committee
was not consulted in advance of appointments 5 The Committee did
try to make recommendations to the Attorney-General on an ad hoc
basis, but this soon proved unsatisfactory. It was at this time, however, that the Attorney-General began to consult with various state
and local bar groups on each nomination; this move clearly foreshadowed the entry of the ABA Committee into the process, for the
inconvenience of dealing with a multitude of groups with differing
standards and methods of operation was not as useful as dealing
always with a single group as the representative of the organized Bar.
Perhaps the most compelling cause to be assigned to the inability
of the ABA Committee to establish a liaison with the Justice Department during this period was the hostility of President Truman. Reacting in characteristic fashion to the Frieda Hennock case, Truman
noted that "he had appointed plenty of good judges opposed by the
bar associations," and that such opposition didn't upset him. He
stated that he was glad to have bar association approval of his judicial
appointments if forthcoming, but that failure to receive such approval
would never deter him from making any appointment. 56
In contrast to this chilly reception in the White House, the first
efforts of the Committee on Federal judiciary were warmly received
in the press. Particularly in view of a long line of undistinguished
Truman appointees to the federal bench,5 7 there was some feeling
that perhaps the "right" people weren't advising on nominations. The
New York Times took strong exception to Truman's "flippant dismissal
54.
55.
56.
57.
Chief

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMmITTEE ON JUDICIARy, 72 A.B.A. REP. 256 (1947).

Ibid.
New York Times, June 29, 1951, p. 23, col. 5.
For example, the New York Times said of the nomination of Fred Vinson as
Justice: "Secretary Vinson has been an able public servant ....
But he is hardly

the ideal appointment to the highest judicial office in the land, and he can hardly be
said to measure up to the stature of his most recent predecessors in the post to which

he has been named.

... New York Times, June 7, 1946, p. 18, col. 2.
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of the opinions of bar groups." "Key members of the bar association,"
it said, "are the best equipped to pass upon court nominations who
come from the ranks of fellow lawyers."
Since the President cannot possibly examine personally all the qualifications
of all nominees to the bench, it is necessary for us to ask whose judgment
he substitutes for that of bar associations. If the answer to that question
is that he relies on the advice of political leaders, we cannot endorse such
a substitution. 58

On balance, the record of the Committee during these formative
years was promising if not entirely fruitful. It had established a
cordial relationship with the Senate Judiciary Committee, had
received favorable treatment in the press, and had at least in a few
instances contributed to the rejection of "unqualified" individuals. Its
performance satisfied the once hesitant Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association, and in 1949 it was given permanent status
as a Standing Committee, with its duties limited to matters of appointment and removal of federal judges. Peripheral subjects such as
retirement and appellate jurisdiction were transferred to another
committee.5 9
Perhaps the most important decision which the Committee had
to make regarding its objectives and style of operation was made
during this formative period, and subsequent events proved it to have
been the wisest of decisions. Much as any other newly-formed group,
the Committee had to agree on a plan of action which would both
achieve the stated goals of the parent ABA, operate in a manner
consistent with the expectations of the ABA leadership, and at the
same time function in a way most likely to achieve positive results
from the politically oriented judicial selection process. Given the
assumption that dissatisfaction with the results of the judicial selection
process stimulated the formation of the Special Committee on
Judiciary in 1946, the major policy decision the Committee had to
make was to answer the question, "How can the results be changed?"
Clearly, the alternatives were to either work to change the system
entirely-as other ABA committees were doing on the state level-or
try to achieve sufficient influence within the system to make it produce
favorable results. The Committee chose to pursue the latter alternative, over the vehement and persistent objections of two of its
members.
As its first item of business in 1946, and again in each of the
next three years, the Committee defeated resolutions by Loyd Wright
of California and/or A. W. Trice of Oklahoma designed to encourage
58. New York Times, June 30, 1951, p. 14, col. 3.
59. See RXPORT OF THE SPEcAI CoMMTTEE ON
(1949).

JurDciAnY,

74 A.B.A. REP. 385
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the Congress to (a) set minimum requirements of judicial experience
for higher federal judges, (b) make naturalized citizens ineligible
for federal judgeships, and (c) provide for minimum legal experience for lower federal judgeships. 60 The decision was made to work
wiihin the prevailing system, and to bank on achieving results that
way. These two alternatives were not incompatible at first, but they
became so in late 1952 when the Committee first entered into a
liaison with the Attorney-General. It is entirely possible that had
the Committee not devoted most of its efforts in this period to trying
to work within the system, and had instead worked equally hard to
reform it, it would not have been able to gain even the partial access
which it achieved in 1952.
It should be noted that the Committee did depart from this policy
in one respect. It consistently sought bi-partisan selection of judges
as an intermediate step toward achieving a primary goal of the ABAnon-partisan selection. Aside from this exception, it assumed a posture which would permit it,in the "American tradition," to seek
gradual reform from within the system.
(2) The first six years of the Eisenhower Administration, from
1953 through 1958, saw the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
achieve a degree of access to the judicial selection process not theretofore attained by any private association. Until mid-1952 the Committee had made recommendations to the Attorney-General on an
ad hoc basis when it learned of the existence of judicial vacancies.
Very often its recommendations were submitted after the choice had
already been determined, or a firm commitment given. The Committee's continuous offers "to make its services available to investigating and reporting upon candidates other than those recommended
by it" were never accepted. 61 Failure to reach any agreement with
the Attorney-General posed several problems for the Committee.
First, even when the Committee could produce derogatory evidence,
it was difficult for the Attorney-General to take any position other
than that of defending a nomination to which he was already committed. Second, when a nomination was publicized, it was difficult
to elicit, even confidentially, candid opinions of the candidate by
members of the Bar. Since the expectation is that virtually every
judicial nominee is confirmed by the Senate, no lawyer would want
to be in a position of criticizing someone who would eventually sit
in judgment on his cases. 62 Finally, if the Committee were forced to
carry its whole case to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which would
60. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDicIARy, 73 A.B.A. REP. 268, 275, 414.
61. REPORT OF THE STANDINO COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 77 A.B.A. REP.

215 (1952).
62. Ibid.
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consider only derogatory evidence, it would be unable to exert any
creative influence in the process-i.e., promoting good judges.
In the summer of 1952 a series of events occurred which permitted
the Committee to gain its long sought access to the nomination
process. The Department of Justice had been rocked by several
scanidals uncovered by investigations of the House Judiciary Committee. 63 In the light of these disclosures, which resulted in several
"vacancies" in the Justice Department hierarchy, the Committee urged
Attorney-General McGranery to fill the vacancies with outstanding
lawyers. The Attorney-General asked Stephen Mitchell, the House
Committee Counsel and later National Democratic Chairman if he
could "find any lawyers meeting these specifications" and who would
be "willing to come to Washington... at the end of an Administration
that obviously is going to be replaced." McGranery is reported to
have told Mitchell that if he found such lawyers, they would be
appointed. 64
Among others, Mitchell contacted Ross Malone of New Mexico, who
was a past member of the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association and then a member of the ABA's Board of Governors.
After a conference with McGranery, Malone accepted the Attorney
General's offer to become Deputy Attorney-General, the chief agent
of the Attorney-General in recruiting federal judges. Recalling his
tenure as Deputy Attorney-General, Malone states:
Through my membership in the House of Delegates of the American Bar

Association and subsequently on the Board of Governors, I was aware of
the fact that the Committee on Federal Judiciary had sought for some

time to make its voice heard in the selection of federal judges prior to the
time that a decision bad been reached in the Department and a name

forwarded to the White House. I was 65also aware that the Committee had
been wholly unsuccessful in these efforts.

Malone was firmly convinced that the American Bar Association was
ideally suited to furnish the Administration with non-partisan advice
on prospective nominees. He therefore recommended to the AttorneyGeneral that the Department inaugurate a system of consultation with
the Committee on Federal Judiciary to obtain its views before a final
decision on any nomination was made. According to Malone,
and directed him to make whatever arrangements
McGranery agreed
66
were necessary.
63. See New York Times, April 3-5, 1952, p. 1. In the midst of these investigations,
President Truman fired Attorney General McGrath and replaced him with U.S. District

Judge James P. McGranery.
64. Letter From Ross Malone to Joel B. Grossman, March 6, 1963.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
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Malone "advised" Committee Chairman Howard Burns of the
decision to submit names to the Committee and await its recommendations before making a final decision. He said that at the same
time FBI investigations were initiated on the two or three serious
contenders for each vacancy, the same names would be submitted
67
to the Committee. Burns naturally agreed.
By the time this agreement was reached, the adjournment of Congress was imminent, and the Administration decided to make no
interim appointments to the federal bench. Thus, there was no
opportunity to put the agreement into effect. When President-elect
Eisenhower designated Herbert Brownell of New York as his AttorneyGeneral, and Brownell chose William Rogers as his Deputy, the two
met with McGranery and Malone to discuss the transition of Administrations as it affected the Justice Department. Malone explained to
them the arrangement he had made with the ABA Committee, and
in his own words, "was extremely anxious to sell" this innovation to
them. He reports that Brownell didn't commit himself on the idea,
68
but expressed an initially favorable reaction.
Brownell and Rogers decided to continue the agreement excepting
only that they requested the Committee on Federal Judiciary to
discontinue suggesting names of its own in advance of being asked
to evaluate a particular candidate by the Attorney-General. The
Committee reluctantly accepted this stipulation, noting in its next
Annual Report that "your committee believes that it could be more
helpful to the Department of Justice in many instances by affirmatively recommending candidates of outstanding qualifications who
have been selected without any regard to political'considerations." 69
A second favorable development for the Committee was the support of its objectives by President Eisenhower. In sharp contrast to
the hostile attitude of his predecessor, Eisenhower applauded the
efforts of the organized bar, and in particular, the American
Bar Association. It was through Eisenhower's influence that
Supreme Court appointments were also referred to the ABA Committee for evaluation. Prior to 1953, Committee attempts to have
Supreme Court nominees "checked out" were rebuffed. The appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court had always been considered an unfettered Presidential prerogative. As a result, some
67. Ibid. These facts were confirmed by two letters from Committee Chairman
Burns to Joel B. Grossman, October 8, 1962, and April 25, 1963. Burns emphasized
that the liaison idea was primarily Malone's and was not opposed-but not actively
supported-by Attorney-General McGranery. See also REPORT OF T=E STANDING COMrITEE ON FEDEnAL JUDIcILlY, 77 A.B.A. REP. 215 (1952).
68. Ibid.
69. REPORT OF THE STANDING COUMTTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 78 A.B.A. REP.
223, 224 (1953).
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eyebrows were raised when, upon the death of Chief Justice Fred
Vinson in 1953, the Chairman of the ABA Committee offered his
group's "assistance" to the Attorney-General in the search for a
successor. Attorney-General Brownell announced that any names
the Committee submitted would be considered. However, before the
Committee could submit a list, the recess appointment of Earl Warren
was announced, and all the Committee could do was to recommend
confirmation."
In September, 1956, the new Chairman of the Committee, Bernard
G. Segal of Philadelphia, met with Brownell and Rogers to review
the relationship of the Committee to the Department of justice.
Segal brought up the fact that the Committee was "without function"
respecting nominations of Supreme Court Justices, and suggested
that this be rectified. Later that same month, at a press conference,
President Eisenhower said in answer to a query about possible successors to retiring Justice Minton, "I believe also that we must never
appoint a man who doesn't have the recognition of the American Bar
Association." 71 No similar statement by a previous President has ever
been recorded.
Later, at the direction of the President, the name of William
Brennan was submitted to the ABA Committee. Brennan was highly
recommended by the Committee and subsequently was appointed to
the Supreme Court. This procedure was followed again in 1957 upon
the retirement of Justice Reed. Brownell discussed with Chairman
Segal a number of possibilities. When the name of Circuit Judge
Charles Whittaker was given to the Committee, he was enthusiastically endorsed, and subsequently nominated.72 The precedent of
consulting with the Committee on Federal Judiciary on Supreme
Court as well as lower court nominations is still followed, although
as will be suggested below, the influence of the Committee in the
case of Supreme Court nominations may be more apparent than real.
At the meeting mentioned above, Segal complained to Brownell
and Rogers that in at least six instances, nominations or recess
appointments had been made to the lower federal courts without prior
consultation of the Committee. Segal noted that this was a breach
of the 1953 agreement and argued that if such omissions continued,
the value of the liaison to both the Committee and the AttorneyGeneral would diminish and the Committee would have to "reappraise" the nature and intensity of its efforts in behalf of the Attor70. REPORT
228 (1954).

71.

OF THE STANDING

COMMFTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY,

REPORT OF THE STANDING CoMATTEE oN FEDERAL JUDICIARY,

432, 433 (1957).

79 A.B.A.

REP.

82 A.B.A. REr.

72. REPORT OF THE STANDING Co NUrEE ON FEDERAL JuDIcIARY, 82 A.B.A. REP.

272 (1957). See also New York Times, March 3, 1957, p. 1, col. 3.
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ney-General.7 3 Since that meeting there has been no record of an
appointment to the federal bench which completely bypassed the
Committee.
It was during this period that the Committee's "right" to be consulted on each prospective nomination grew into a virtual veto power.
From 1953-1961 there were ten nominations made over the objections
of the Committee. After mid-1958, however, the Attorney General
was directed by President Eisenhower to give "considerable" weight
to the Committee's recommendations, and no one was nominated
without Committee approval during the remainder of the Eisenhower
Administration. In fact, the only nomination made contrary to the
Committee's recommendation from 1956 to 1961 was a marginal case
in which the candidate was opposed primarily on the grounds that
he was over-age; and confirmation by the Senate was not opposedJ 4
In contrast to the improvement in its position at the nomination
stage of the selection process, the Committee found its operations
stymied by the resistance of individual senators and the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Where the ABA Committee was unable to
block a nomination, it was also unable to block confirmation 5 It was
readily apparent that complete effectiveness would not be achieved
until an understanding was reached with senators and the Senate
Committee, similar to that with the Attorney-General. Attempts were
made to convince individual senators of the need for prior consultation
with at least their local bar associations, if not the ABA Committee,
before publicly committing themselves to nominations which they
would then have to defend, even in the face of damaging and
embarassing evidence uncovered by the Committee.
It is noteworthy that in dealing with this obstacle, the Committee
still followed the policy of working within the system. No attempts
were made to challenge the "right" of senators to choose federal
judges in their own states, although such challenges were being issued
with increasing frequency in the pages of the American Bar Associa6
tion Journal.7
In an attempt to at least blunt the effects of this senatorial prerogative, the Committee did resort to an extensive publicity campaign
favoring non-partisan selection of judges. It sought, without success,
73. Interview with Bernard

G.

Segal, October 30, 1962. See also REPORT OF THE

STANDING COM1aTTEE ON FEDERAL JU)ICIARy, 81 A.B.A. REP. 440 (1956).

74. This case involved J. Axel Beck, who was appointed to the district court for the
District of South Dakota in 1958. Beck was sixty-three years of age, and strongly
supported by South Dakota's two Republican senators, Francis Case and Karl Mundt.
75. During 1953-1961 the Committee was unable to block the confirmation of any
of the candidates which it opposed.
76. See, e.g., Miller, Politics and the Courts: The Struggle for Good Judges Goes On,
42 A.B.A.J. 939 (1956).
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to have both major political parties insert pledges of non-partisan
77
selection in their 1952 and 1956 campaign platforms.
In assessing the nature and extent of the Committee's increasing
prestige during this period, the public furor surrounding the federal
judiciary cannot be overlooked as a possible contributing factor.
Stemming in part from its historic 1954 decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, which alienated southerners, and a series of decisions
in 1956 and 1957 which appeared to give some aid and comfort to
"political" offenders, which alienated many northern conservatives,
the Supreme Court was subjected to a consistent and vituperative
verbal barrage of criticism.78 Much talk and energy was given over
by the 85th Congress to ways of "curbing" the court, and of these,
a prominent solution was to alter the method of judicial selection.
Since many of the "offending" decisions were venturesome in their
departure from long-established precedents, the focus of reform
centered on recruiting judges who were likely to be more conservative
79
in their adherence to stare decisis.
While there was much sympathy among members of the American
Bar Association for this substantive criticism of the Court's work,
there was no official condemnation of the Supreme Court as an
institution. ABA President Charles Rhyne called on America's lawyers
to fight any bills designed to subvert the Court's historic composition
and prerogatives. He declared that "particular decisions may be
wrong, but the independence of the judiciary connotes the power
to be wrong as well as right."80
Nevertheless, the constant demands by critics that the method of
selecting judges be changed to insure the selection of more experienced men lent strength to the ABA Committee's drive for the
informal establishment of a similar standard. The pressures of this
verbal assault may have been in part responsible for President Eisenhower's strong support of the principle of consulting the ABA on all
judicial appointments, and for his insistence, after 1954, that all
77.

REPORT OF THE STANDING

COmmiITrE ON FEDERAL JuDICIARY, 81

A.B.A. REP.

271 (1956).

78. These "offending" decisions are well chronicled in PiTcHnErr, THE POLITICAL
(1957). A good discussion of Congress' reaction
to these decisions can be found in MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962).
79. Of the numerous bills introduced in the 85th Congress designed to "curb" the
Supreme Court, at least fourteen attempted in one way or another to alter the
process of selecting federal judges. These included proposals to provide for the
election of judges in the states where they serve, H.R. REs. 119, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957); to provide for the appointment of federal judges by the state courts. H.R.J. REs.
438, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); to require judicial nominees to have five or more
years prior judicial experience, S.1184, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); and to require
the President to make Supreme Court nominations from a list of names drawn up by
the American Bar Association, H.R. REs. 406, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
80. New York Times, May 7, 1958, p. 27, col. 6.
OFFENDER AND THE WARREN COURT
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Supreme Court nominees have at least nominal judicial experience.
By bringing the ABA more intimately into the selection process, the
Administration may have sought to stymie attacks not only on its
freedom to nominate, but on the powers of the Supreme Court as
well.
(3) 1958-1964. One of the complaints which the ABA Committee
frequently articulated prior to mid-1958 was that it was being consuilted too late in the nomination process for it to be a really effective
advisor. Since the name it received for investigation was usually the
name to be submitted (it rarely received the "several" names that
Ross Malone had envisioned), and many political commitments had
been made beforehand, the Committee could deter a nomination only
by the presentation of clearly disqualifying information.8 ' This procedure was also disadvantageous to the Attorney-General in a number
of ways, particularly in cases where there were a number of likely
and apparently well qualified candidates for the same vacancy. 82 If
he were able to obtain advance information on each of several candidates sponsored by prominent politicians, the Attorney-General could
more easily engineer the nomination of the best candidate, or the
candidate he preferred.
With this mutual advantage in mind, Attorney-General William
Rogers, Deputy Attorney-General Lawrence Walsh and Bernard Segal
arranged in 1958 for the institution of two new procedures. First,
the Attorney-General agreed to refer to the Committee for informal
investigation and evaluation the name of each person being given
serious consideration for a federal judgeship. This would not displace,
but would rather augment the procedure already in effect whereby
the Committee made a formal investigation and report on the candidate most likely to be selected. This new procedure was to be, in
effect, a secret, preliminary screening process.
The second innovation, which apparently was initiated by the
Committee, was to construct a four point scale of evaluation to
replace the general designations of "Qualified" or "Not Qualified"
theretofore used. The Committee suggested this to enable it to
differentiate between "its function in seeking the best qualified candidates.., and its function in passing upon names submitted to it by
the Justice Department."
All candidates would now be rated as
"Not Qualified," "Qualified," "Well Qualified," or "Exceptionally Well
Qualified."
81. Segal, Federal Judicial Selection-Progress and the Promise of the Future, 46
MASS. L.Q. 143 (1961).
82. Interview with former Deputy Attorney-General Lawrence Walsh, December 22,

1962.
83. REPORT
350 (1958).
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These new procedures caused a tremendous increase in the work
load of the Committee. With the number of vacancies sufficiently
high, the work of many Committee members could become virtually a full-time job. Certainly it became one for the Chairman,
who would be involved in processing all of the informal reports, not
just those in his own circuit. In 1958-1959, for example, the Commit-

tee submitted 127 formal or informal reports, compared with 72
formals for the preceding two years. 84 But more important, the combination of these two new procedures accorded the Committee a more
significant role in the selection process. It was no longer limited
simply to passing upon a choice already made and not likely to be
reversed. It was now in a position not only to block unqualified
candidates effectively, but also to push for candidates who were
better qualified by its standards. To be sure, it still could not exert
much influence at the key recruitment stage, but it had advanced
substantially toward that goal. From the negativism and frustrations

of a veto group, the Committee on Federal Judiciary assumed more
of a creative role in the selection process. For the first time in its
twelve year existence, the Committee was able to begin to fulfill one
of the major objectives of the ABA: to promote the nomination of
the persons it considered best qualified. 85
In its Annual Report for 1960, the Committee was able to make
the following report of progress:
[The Committee's relationship with the Administration] stands at the stage

where no person is given consideration for nomination to the Federal
bench without at least preliminary screening by members of your Com-

mittee, and it is reasonably assured that no appointment would be made
of a person whom your Committee, for valid reasons, reports as unqualified.
[In a two year period] . . . every nomination ... sent to the Senate was
preceded by a favorable report of your Committee ....

Viewed against the background of the situation eight years ago, this

represents remarkable progress. Nevertheless, the goal of this Association

does not rest here.
The interplay of the various elements which go into the eventual
appointment of a federal judge is such that compromises often result, and
as a consequence, the appointee, though qualified, is not the most highly

qualified.86

With that report was expressed the hope that with the inevitable
84.

REPORT OF =

277 (1959).

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JuDicIAY,

84 A.B.A.

REP.

85. Report by Bernard G. Segal to House of Delegates, MIDYEAn MEETINGS OF THE
AnmucAN BAR AssocrunoN, Chicago, 1959 (mimeo).
86. REPORT OF THE STANDING COMIrIEE ON FEDERAL JUDIcIAnY, 85 A.B.A. REp.
452, 453 (1960).
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transition in Administrations, the function of the Committee would
remain unimpaired. The Committee declared "our gains to this date
have taken root, and may before long be institutionalized as part of
the political system of our country."87 This report, adopted by the
House of Delegates, urged the incoming President to continue the
present working agreement including a pledge "not [to] nominate as
a federal judge any person who, after thorough investigation and
consideration is, for valid reasons, reported by the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary as not qualified to serve as a federal judge." 88
In addition to this plea, the Committee again sought to have a
plank on judicial selection inserted in the 1960 platform of each
major political party, calling for the bi-partisan selection of judges.
The Democratic Platform made no reference to judicial selection, but
the Republicans included the following statement: "Needed federal
judgeships, appointed on the basis of the highest qualifications and
without limitation to a single political party, should be created to
expedite administration of justice in federal courts."89 This was "the
first known plank regarding judicial appointments in any major party
platform.
Whatever fears the Committee on Federal Judiciary may have
had concerning the future of its liaison with the Justice Department
were directed primarily toward an incoming Democratic President.
If the 1960 Republican Presidential candidate, Vice-President Richard
M. Nixon, were elected, then almost certainly the Rogers-Walsh team
would have remained and no problems of transition would have
arisen. But the views of Senator John Kennedy toward the role
of the ABA Committee were not known, and the absence of a
judicial selection plank in the Democratic Platform did not alleviate
this uncertainty. Senator Kennedy did send a letter during the
campaign to the President of the American Bar Association, John
Randall of Iowa, advising him that he agreed with the idea of a
qualified and independent judiciary, and that partisanship would not
be the paramount basis for selection. 90 But the very ambiguity of
this statement may have been a chilling reminder to the Committee
that its favored position depended entirely on the indulgence of the
President.
Before the inauguration of President Kennedy on January 20th,
1961, Attorney-General Robert Kennedy and Deputy Attorney-General Byron White met with Segal and ABA President Whitney North
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 454.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 455.
Letter From John F. Kennedy to John Randall, August 30, 1960, REPORT
STANDING COM IITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 86 A.B.A. REP. 118 (1961).
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Seymour and "unequivocally" agreed to submit all names under
consideration for informal screening and eventual formal evaluation.
According to Segal, this commitment extended also to "appointing
only those who were pronounced clearly qualified."9' But there
seems to have been, at best, some confusion on this latter point.
Subsequent events made very clear that, unlike its predecessors, the
Kennedy Administration did not intend to continue to extend to the
ABA Committee the veto group role it had previously occupied. The
Kennedy Administration appointed eight persons designated "not
qualified" during its first two years in office. This represented 7.3
per cent of the judicial appointments made during this two year
period, as compared with 5.7 per cent during the entire Eisenhower
Administration and only 1.2 per cent during the second Eisenhower
term.
Answering criticism of this record in the Committee's Annual
Report for 1962, Deputy Attorney-General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
"reminded" the House of Delegates "that the responsibility is the
President's and the Senate's, and this Association does not have and
would not wish to have a veto over the appointments to be made.
I have no doubt," Katzenbach continued,
that amidst these many appointments . .. there will be disappointments

and some of the judges appointed will not come up to the standard which
the Administration would wish for all judges. I would be very surprised if
there were not judges appointed who will prove to have been unworthy
and unqualified. I would be very surprised if this Committee were
omniscient and infallible in that respect, and I do not think that they would
claim that infallibility. I think that at least some of the Judges found by
this Committee to be unqualified will .. .prove to have been good ap-

pointments. I think some of the Judges found to be qualified will, over a
period of years, prove to have been bad appointments. 92
Despite this apparent diminution of its influence, it cannot yet be
said that over a period of time the Committee will not again approximate an informal veto group. The political patronage pressures on
any new Administration are great, and it simply does not have the
freedom of operation which an out-going Administration with a lame93
duck President can manage.
One cannot disregard party affiliation and philosophy in explaining
the relationship of the Committee on Federal Judiciary to the Eisen-

hower and Kennedy Administrations. Despite its public service and
non-partisan facade, the American Bar Association is, in terms of its
91. SEGAL,

op. cit. supra note 81, at 147.

92. Oral Reply of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to House of Delegates, ANN. MEETNG
OF TE AjMmRcAN BAR AssocIATON, San Francisco, 1962 (mimeo), p. 3.
93. Cf. REPORT OF THE STANDING COwn/rrrEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, A.B.A. REP.
601 (1962).
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political orientation and policy values, much closer to the Republican
than the Democratic "orbit" of supporting groups, and no Democratic
Administration could afford politically to overlook this factor entirely.
While there are certain political advantages which even a Democratic
Administration can gain from working with the ABA Committee, it
94
could never afford a "captive" image.

V. THE

STATUS OF THE CoMmrrrEE-1964

Any appraisal of the development of the Committee's prerogatives
and functions from 1946-1964 would have to consider the institutionalization of its relationship with the Attorney-General as the most
significant advance. While it may yet fall short of the aims of the
American Bar Association, it far exceeds the access acquired previously by any other interest group. Although informal, the prospective
continuity of this relationship is enhanced by the strong and favorable
influence of the articulate press. Typical of the widespread editorial
acceptance of the legitimacy of the Committee's function was the
following statement in the New York Times:
President Kennedy came into office at a time of approximate political parity

in the Federal courts. This has now been thrown off balance by the appointments he has made. [His first eighty-five appointments went to eightyfour Democrats and one Liberal.] But there are still some forty judicial
vacancies. In filling them Republicans might be favored among candidates

of equal competence. But no one should be appointed who is not "well
qualified" or "exceptionally well qualified" in the opinion of the Bar

Association-and in fact.95

Thus, the Times was prepared to go even further than the ABA Committee itself and exclude appointees who were only "qualified" and
no higher. Similar criticism of Kennedy's appointment of "not qualifieds" was to be found throughout the country. The ChristianScience
Monitor found it "peculiar" that "of all the lawyers in the United
States who are regarded as Republicans, the Administration could
not find seven whose juristic abilities would warrant their appointment ahead of the seven whom a bar association considers 'not
qualified."' 96
While such support could not assure the Committee's position in the
event of some dispute between it and the Attorney-General, it would
probably serve to prevent the eruption of minor dislocations. The
94. This manuscript was completed prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.
But the transition in administrations has not substantially affected the position of the
ABA Committee in the judicial selection process. Interview with Assistant Deputy
Attorney-General Joseph Dolan, March 11, 1964.
95. New York Times, March 9, 1962, p. 28, col. 1.
96. Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 1962, p. 14.
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Committee's position is based on its usefulness as a source of information to the Attorney-General, and as long as this usefulness continues,
it would probably not be seriously affected by minor dislocations.
In appraising the success which the Committee has had to-date, one
major factor has not been mentioned. And yet it seems probable that
this was the necessary, if not the sufficient, factor. It was not until
the latter part of the New Deal that the American Bar Association
sought to represent, in theory if not in fact, the entire legal profession.
To be sure, many times before then it had spoken in behalf of
America's lawyers. But until it adopted a federated system of representation in its governing body, the House of Delegates, and actively
sought to enroll the rank and file members of the profession on its
rolls, it lacked the credentials to represent the organized Bar to the
Attorney-General. 9 7 Its claim to representation is still imperfect, and
still less than half of all lawyers are members. But the propriety of
it's assuming the role of "Voice" of the American Bar is much less
questionable. Without these credentials, it is doubtful that it could
have exerted any systematic influence whatever on the selection of
federal judges.
97. Cf. Radin, The Achievements of the American Bar Association: A Sixty Year
Record, 26 A.B.A.J. 135, 141, 230, 241 (1940). The ABA now has 43.7% of the
lawyer population on its membership rolls, as compared to only a fraction of that in
1902.

